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"Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion .
INTRODUCTION
When this First Amendment prohibition, more commonly re-
ferred to today as the Establishment Clause, was added to the
* J.D. Candidate, University at Buffalo School of Law, May 1994.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The portion of the First Amendment pertaining to religion
reads in its entirety: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " Id. The first clause of this prohibition is
more commonly referred to as the Establishment Clause, while the second clause is
known as the Free Exercise Clause.
Both First Amendment religion clauses have been the focus of extensive discussion,
and the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause has
been the subject of much debate. This Comment, however, strictly confines itself to a dis-
cussion of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence with respect to the Establishment Clause.
For a general discussion of the Free Exercise Clause, see Michael W. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1409 (1990). For a discussion of the tenuous relationship which exists between the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, see Jesse H. Choper, The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 (1980).
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United States Constitution in 1791, "no other country had provided
so carefully to prevent the combination of the power of religion with
the power of the national government."2
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson led the movement to in-
clude this prohibition within the Bill of Rights. By examining their
arguments advocating the adoption of the Establishment Clause, an
indication as to what was originally meant by these ten words can
be ascertained.4
Over the last two hundred years, "[tihe responsibility of inter-
preting the First Amendment and applying it to complicated real
situations has belonged ultimately to the United States Supreme
Court."5 The Court has not, however, always exercised this respon-
sibility in a consistent manner. In fact, over time the Court has cre-
ated, rejected, and then re-created various frameworks to be used in
deciding Establishment Clause questions.6
This Comment traces the Supreme Court's jurisprudence with
respect to the Establishment Clause. It focuses primarily on cases
arising within the school context, as most disputes which have come
before the Court raising Establishment Clause questions have in-
volved the relationship between education and religion.7 Part I pre-
sents the historical origins of the Court's early Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. It was during these formative years that the
Court developed the coercion analysis to decide Establishment
Clause questions. Influenced by the writings of Madison and Jeffer-
2. ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION at xiii (1982). The drafters of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
knew of the religious persecution prevalent throughout Europe from which so many
early-American settlers had fled. The drafters also recognized a continuation of that same
intolerance and persecution here in America. They were determined, therefore, to prevent
a combination of the power of religion with the power of the national government. LYNDA
B. FENWICK, SHOULD THE CHILDREN PRAY?: A HISTORICAL, JUDICIAL, AND POLITICAL
EXAMINATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL PRAYER 1 (1989).
3. For a discussion of the important roles that both Madison and Jefferson played in
framing the Establishment Clause, see FENWICK, supra note 2, at 91-100.
4. See MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE
AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978) (arguing that the Framers' intent regarding
the Establishment Clause can be discerned from their writings and should be applied in
constitutional adjudication today). But cf Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 227 (Jack N. Rakove ed.,
1990) (positing that the Framers' intent should not be considered authoritative or binding
in resolving current constitutional disputes).
5. FENWICK, supra note 2, at 1.
6. For an overview of the various approaches utilized by the Supreme Court in ren-
dering decisions in this area, see DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH-STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES: MAKING SENSE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 1-50 (1991).
7. Writing for the majority in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), Justice
Brennan commented: "The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance
with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools." Id. at 583-84.
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son," this analysis required a specific finding of government coercion
for a state or federal practice to be-considered a violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause. Government must have coerced or compelled an
individual to religious practice or belief for a constitutional violation
to have occurred.9
Part IT analyzes the Court's rejection of the coercion analysis in
the early 1960s. This rejection eventually resulted in the develop-
ment of the Lemon test,'0 which has been the principal tool employed
by the Supreme Court over the last twenty years to decide Estab-
lishment Clause questions.
Part Ill discusses the difficulty that courts have experienced in
applying the Lemon framework to complicated Establishment
Clause cases and the resultant dissatisfaction that has emerged.
Although present at all levels of the judiciary, this discontent has
been most recognizable at the level of the Supreme Court.
Part IV traces a recent shift in the Court's jurisprudence with
respect to the Establishment Clause. Resulting from the dissatis-
faction with Lemon, this shift has led to the advocation of a return to
a jurisprudence based upon a finding of government coercion.
Part V examines the Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Weis-
man1' and addresses the implications of Lee on future Establish-
ment Clause cases. Lee provided the Court with the opportunity to
respond to the expressed dissatisfaction with the Lemon test by re-
jecting the Lemon framework and adopting a coercion analysis. The
Supreme Court failed to seize this opportunity. Lee neither explicitly
overruled the Lemon test nor openly readopted the coercion analy-
sis. However, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lee heralds the
Court's movement toward a readoption of the coercion analysis. This
Comment asserts that the Coures Establishment Clause jurisprudence
will ultimately come full circle with the readoption of the coercion
analysis as the touchstone of an Establishment Clause violation.
The ramifications implicit in the readoption of the coercion
8. See discussion infra part I.A.
9. See Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another False Claim
About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37, 39 (1991); see also Michael W.
McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WMi. & MARY L. REV. 933
(1986).
10. Named after the case which articulated its framework, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971), this test has been central to Establishment Clause jurisprudence since
its inception. See discussion infra part II.C. Under the three-pronged Lemon test, a state
or federal practice will pass constitutional muster only if: (1) the practice has a secular
legislative purpose; (2) the practice's principal or primary effect is one that neither en-
hances nor inhibits religion; and (3) the practice does not foster an excessive entangle-
ment with religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
11. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). Lee addressed the constitutionality of invocations and
benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies. See discussion infra part V.
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analysis are extremely significant. In effect, the Supreme Court's
readoption of this analysis will provide for greater accommodation of
religion in American society. Formal recognition of coercion as the
central component of any Establishment Clause analysis will em-
power the Court to sustain many religious and social programs that
it has been forced to strike down in the past under the flawed Lemon
framework. 12 With the readoption of the coercion analysis as the
central Establishment Clause framework, the Court would only be
required to proscribe government conduct "that has the purpose and
effect of coercing or altering religious belief or action."'3 Ultimately,
this means that the government may not "undertake to aid religion,
but that it can pursue its legitimate purposes even if to do so inci-
dentally assists the various religions."14 Such a practice would re-
align the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence not only with
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution, but also with that of
many Americans today. 5
I. ORIGINS OF THE COERCION ANALYSIS
A. Historical Origins
Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has often relied
upon the intent of the Framers in interpreting the Constitution and
its amendments. 6 With respect to the religion provisions of the First
12. As one commentator noted: "Under this standard, the Court would sustain many
worthwhile, progressive social programs that it has struck down in the past-programs
such as remedial education for economically and educationally deprived children on the
premises of their own schools." McConnell, supra note 9, at 940 (citing Aguilar v. Felton,
473 U.S. 402 (1985)).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Public reaction to the decision in Lee v. Weisman was not favorable. For exam-
ple, the Family Research Council expressed disgust at the Supreme Court's decision in
Lee, calling its Establishment Clause jurisprudence "intellectually bankrupt." Family
Group Deplores Decision in School Prayer Case, PR Newswire, June 24, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File [hereinafter Family Group]. According to Family Re-
search Council President Gary Bauer:
Lee v. Weisman offered perfect opportunities to hold that religion is not toxic,
that public schools are not the same thing as the state, and that people old
enough to vote and be drafted are old enough to resist such minimal
"indoctrination" as a theistic graduation invocation. But the Court threw away
all three opportunities with both hands.
The Court's First Amendment jurisprudence continues to collide with rea-
son, with its own stated rationale, with the living experience of the American
people and with the guiding values of governance that have made prayer a fix-
ture of our public life from Congress to the state legislatures to the Court itself.
Id.
16. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
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Amendment, one "must look to the writings of James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson... to guide (if not control) ... interpretation of
the establishment clause." 7
James Madison represented Virginia as a member of the
United States House of Representatives in the first Congress and
played a critical role in the debates concerning the Establishment
Clause.18 Madison proposed an amendment to the Constitution that
ultimately served as a basis for the religion clauses of the First
Amendment. His comments at the time indicated that the purpose
(1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367
(1984); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minne-
sota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S.
149 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408
U.S. 501 (1972); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Cramer v. United States, 325
U.S. 1 (1945); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
457 (1870); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); Thurlow v. Massachu-
setts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847); Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847); Holmes
v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
657 (1838); Briscoe v. Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (19 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(1821); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Sturges v. Crowninshield,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
17. DRAKEMAN, supra note 6, at 52. Of all the Framers who were significant in for-
mulating the principles of liberty by which this nation was to be guided, Madison and Jef-
ferson have been remembered as the "architects of our principles of religious liberty...."
American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 132 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting). The thoughts of these two individuals regarding the Estab-
lishment Clause can be gleaned from JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE
AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENT (1785), reprinted in THE COMPLETE MADISON, HIS BASIC
WRITINGS 299 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) and THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ES-
TABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1779), reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON 545 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) [hereinafter JEFFERSON].
18. See generally JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985).
19. The text of Madison's original proposition read: "The civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be es-
tablished, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any
pretext, infringed." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). In the House, Madi-
son's proposal underwent revision and the amendment became: "[N]o religion shall be es-
tablished by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed." Id. at 757. In the
Senate, the amendment was revised further to read: "Congress shall make no law estab-
lishing Articles of faith or a mode of worship or prohibiting the free exercise of religion." 1
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: MARCH 4, 1789-MARCH 3, 1791, at 166 (Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 1972). As a
result of the two distinct versions which existed in the House and the Senate, a joint con-
ference committee was established "in which Madison played a large part in bringing
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of the proposed amendment was to protect citizens against any form
of governmental action aimed at coercing religious observance or
support. As Madison explained, he "apprehended the meaning of the
words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and en-
force the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship
God in any manner contrary to their conscience."20
An examination of Madison's insights regarding the Establish-
ment Clause compels the conclusion that the First Amendment was
not intended to create a complete separation between religion and
civic life.21 Rather, the Establishment Clause was intended to sepa-
rate religion from the state primarily to protect individuals from the
use of governmental power to coerce support for religion.
Thomas Jefferson was also a primary architect of the principles
embodied in the First Amendment.22 In 1779, Jefferson drafted the
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,23 which was aimed specifi-
cally at combating governmental coercion in the State of Virginia.24
Jefferson, like Madison, did not advocate a complete separation of
forth the language that was adopted as the religion clauses of the first amendment."
Phillip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 9 (1978-79) (citing 1 DOcU-
MENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
MARCH 4, 1789-MARCH 3, 1791, at 181) (Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 1972)).
20. ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 19, at 758. Although the precise language of the
First Amendment religion provisions ultimately adopted by Congress differed from Madi-
son's original language, it appears as if "none of the changes affects Madison's point"
about the true import and meaning of the Establishment Clause. American Jewish Con-
gress, 827 F.2d at 136 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
21. CORD, supra note 2, at 50. Cord points out:
[Tihere is no support in the Congressional records that either the First Con-
gress, which framed the First Amendment, or its principal author and sponsor,
James Madison, intended that Amendment to create a state of complete inde-
pendence between religion and government. In fact the evidence in the public
documents goes the other way.
Id.
22. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
23. JEFFERSON, supra note 17, at 545. Jefferson's bill was presented to the Virginia
Assembly in 1779 and enacted into law in 1786. See FENWICK, supra note 2, at 196-97.
For a comprehensive discussion of this bill, see THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Merrill D. Peterson
& Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988).
24. The bill read in pertinent part:
[N]o man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place,
or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burth-
ened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his religious
opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to
maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no
wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.
JEFFERSON, supra note 17, at 546.
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church and state,' but was concerned with the coercive propensities
of governing bodies.26
The writings of both Madison and Jefferson illustrate that a
separation of church and state was not only desirable but a requisite
element of the new government. However, this separation was not to
be a complete severance of one from the other. Both Madison and
Jefferson were concerned primarily with the coercive influence that
government could exert over its citizens with respect to religion.
7
Ascertaining the Framers' intent is a difficult task. "Had the
Founding Fathers possessed the foresight to predict the multitudes
of interpretations we have tried to read back into their minds, they
might have given us carefully crafted dissertations covering every-
thing from the nascent public school movement to public Christmas
25. Thomas Jefferson's views on church-state relations as embodied in the Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom have been viewed historically as advocating the erection
of "an unbreachable wall of separation between church and state [making] religious
opinions forever private and sacrosanct from intrusion." NATHAN SCHACHNER, THOMAS
JEFFERSON: A BIOGRAPHY 160 (1951). However, such interpretations of Thomas Jefferson
and the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom "have mistaken Jefferson's overall model
for church-state relations by taking his celebrated bill out of its proper legislative con-
text." Daniel L. Dreisbach, A New Perspective on Jefferson's Views on Church-State Rela-
tions: The Virginia Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom in its Legislative Context,
35 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 172, 178 (1991). Jefferson's bill "did not expressly advocate a
sweeping separation between religion and the state." Id. at 184. As one Harvard legal his-
torian has argued, the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom did not "in its enacting
clauses explicitly prohibit establishment." Id. (quoting MARK D. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND
THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 44
(1965)). Instead, Jefferson's bill was "more narrowly drawn to terminate compelled relig-
ious attendance or observance and remove penalties for dissenters who publicly expressed
their religious opinions." Id. at 184-85.
Contrary to the view of the Establishment Clause and church-state relations that is
most often attributed to Jefferson, his "bill did not advocate, in the modern sense at least,
a strict separation between religion and civil government, nor was it a blueprint for a
wholly secular state." Id. at 187. It was, instead, "a bold and eloquent affirmation of the
individual's right to worship God, or not, according to the dictates of conscience, free from
governmental interference or discrimination." Id.
26. Jefferson's bill specifically guarded against three forms of governmental coer-
cion: taxation for the support of religion, religious tests for holding public office, and gov-
ernmental restraints on the propagation of religious beliefs. See JEFFERSON, supra note
17, at 545.
27. The Supreme Court has observed:
[Madison and Jefferson] knew that the First Amendment, which tried to put an
end to governmental control of religion and of prayer, was not written to destroy
either. They knew rather that it was written to quiet well-justified fears which
nearly all of them felt arising out of an awareness that governments of the past
had shackled men's tongues to make them speak only the religious thoughts
that government wanted them to speak and to pray only to the God that gov-
ernment wanted them to pray to.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962).
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displays."28 The Framers, apparently, lacked this foresight.29 They
did, however, provide some indication of the manner in which the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was to be inter-
preted. The Supreme Court looked to the writings of Madison and
Jefferson as it began to develop its early Establishment Clause ju-
risprudence.
B. Early Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
The Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is generally
considered to have begun in 19470 when the Supreme Court com-
prehensively defined the meaning of separation between church and
state in the landmark case of Everson v. Board of Education.3 1
Everson involved a challenge to a New Jersey statute authoriz-
ing the reimbursement of transportation fares to parents of children
attending both public and parochial schools.2 Everson, a district
taxpayer, argued that the statute reimbursing parents of children
attending sectarian schools was, in effect, a "law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion."33
The Court found that the statute did not violate the Establish-
28. DRAKEMAN, supra note 6, at 72.
29. Arguably, the Framers did, in fact, possess the foresight to leave the Establish-
ment Clause flexible enough to be interpreted as society changed even 200 years after the
adoption of the Constitution. This argument fails, however, when one considers the relig-
ious persecution suffered by the founders of this nation which served as the impetus for
the creation of a constitutional amendment addressing religious freedom. It is unlikely
that individuals who had been oppressed because of their religious beliefs would construct
a vague prohibition against these very same practices. See supra note 2 and accompany-
ing text.
30. See CORD, supra note 2, at xiii. As one commentator stated: "[Ilt was not until
1947 that the Supreme Court gave the establishment clause more than a passing refer-
ence." DRAKEMAN, supra note 6, at 6.
31. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). A handful of earlier Establishment Clause cases were heard
by the Court. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Reuben Quick Bear
v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Church of Jesus
Christ Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S.
333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). However, Everson is considered
the seminal case in this constitutional area. See GLENN M. ABERNATHY, CIVL RIGHTS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 173 (6th ed. 1992) (stating that Everson was the "first case to
reach the United States Supreme Court in which the Court really came to grips with the
question of applying the First Amendments establishment clause").
32. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3. Specifically at issue in Everson were the reimbursements
made to parents of children who attended St. Mary's Cathedral High School, a Catholic
School in New Jersey. DALE E. TWOMLEY, PAROCHIAID AND THE COURTS 20 (1979). For a
critique of the Everson decision, see Rodiey K. Smith, Getting Off On the Wrong Foot and
Back On Again: A Reexamination of the History of the Framing of the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 569 (1984).
33. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8.
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ment Clause of the First Amendment.3 4 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court considered both Madison's and Jefferson's writings on the
subject, 5 and ultimately held that a state or federal government
practice could neither "force nor influence a person to go to or to re-
main away from church against his will or force him to profess a be-
lief or disbelief in any religion. [Further], [n]o person [could] be pun-
ished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance."36
34. The majority stated that the statute merely "provided a general program to help
parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and
from accredited schools." Id. at 18. According to Justice Black, state-paid policemen
serving as crossing guards near parochial schools would also fall into this same constitu-
tionally permissible category. Id. at 17.
35. DRAKEMAN, supra note 6, at 6-7. In Everson, "the nine justices unanimously in-
terpreted the establishment clause broadly in the context of the Jeffersonian and Madi-
sonian approach.. . ." Id. at 8.
36. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. The complete test proposed in Everson to determine
whether a governmental practice violates the Establishment Clause provided:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious be-
liefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or insti-
tutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa.
Id.
Everson's "meaning" of the Establishment Clause, which clearly utilizes a coercive
component in its analysis, has been repeatedly cited by courts in subsequent decisions.
See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Ed-
wards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968);
Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Mc-
Collum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir.
1990); Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985); Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526
(11th Cir. 1983); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock, 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982);
Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 850 (1st Cir. 1980); St. Elizabeth
Community Hosp. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1980); Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73
(3d Cir. 1980); Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1974); O'Malley v. Brierley, 477
F.2d 785 (3d Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972); In re Weitzman,
426 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1970); Northside Bible Church v. Goodson, 387 F.2d 534 (5th Cir.
1967); United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964); Quappe v. Endry, 772 F. Sup-
p. 1004 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990); Doe v. Human,
725 F. Supp. 1499 (W.D. Ark. 1989); Hewitt v. Joyner, 705 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1989);
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Central to the Court's analysis in Everson was the element of
coercion. The Court emphasized that compulsion, either by force, in-
fluence or punishment, would not be tolerated. Arguably, if the
Court struck down the New Jersey statute, thereby disallowing
transportation for children attending parochial schools, it would
have allowed government to wield its coercive power over its citi-
zens, in effect, by permitting it to "force [students] ... to remain
away from church against [their] will" and at the same time to pun-
ish its taxpaying citizens "for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs" and "for church attendance."37 The Everson Court found that
actions such as these were not permissible.
In the following year, the Court was presented with another
opportunity to expound upon its developing Establishment Clause
jurisprudence in Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Education.38
The controversy in McCollum, brought by a resident taxpayer of an
Illinois school district, centered around a Board of Education prac-
tice which allowed members of the Roman Catholic, Protestant and
Jewish faiths to offer religious instruction to public school students
once a week in public school classrooms upon written permission of
the students' parents. Students who did not participate in the in-
struction were required to leave the classroom, and students who
had received permission to attend the instruction were required to
Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y.
1987); Bollenbach v. Board of Educ., 659 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); United Christian
Scientists v. Christian Science Bd. of Directors, 616 F. Supp. 476 (D.D.C. 1985); Walter v.
West Virginia Bd. of Educ., 610 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. W. Va. 1985); McCarthy v. Hornbeck,
590 F. Supp. 936 (D. Md. 1984); Zwerling v. Reagan, 576 F. Supp. 1373 (C.D. Cal. 1983);
Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D.N.M. 1983); Doe v. Aldine Indep. Sch.
Dist., 563 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (M.D. Tenn.
1982); McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Voswinkel v.
City of Charlotte, 495 F. Supp. 588 (W.D.N.C. 1980); Anderson v. General Dynamics Con-
vair Aerospace Div., 489 F. Supp. 782 (S.D. Cal. 1980); Citizens Concerned for Separation
of Church and State v. City and County of Denver, 481 F. Supp. 522 (D. Colo. 1979);
Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co.,
464 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977);
Goodwin v. Cross Country Sch. Dist. No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Wilder v.
Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Americans United for Separation of
Church and State v. Bubb, 379 F. Supp. 872 (D. Kan. 1974); Anderson v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 348 F. Supp. 1170 (D. Utah 1972); Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ohio
1972); Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969); United States v.
McFadden, 309 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Koster v. Sharp, 303 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa.
1969); Goodson v. Northside Bible Church, 261 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. Ala. 1966); Schempp v.
Abington, 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
Given the extensive reliance on Everson's articulated meaning of the Establishment
Clause, the coercion analysis appeared to be firmly rooted in Establishment Clause juris-
prudence.
37. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
38. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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be present. 9
The Court struck down the program as violative of the Estab-
lishment Clause. The decision in McCollum was based primarily
upon a finding of governmental coercion in the form of the education
system's compulsory attendance laws.40 In Illinois, as in most states,
secular education attendance was compulsory. The Court noted that
where students "compelled by law to go to school for secular educa-
tion are released in part from their legal duty upon the condition
that they attend the religious classes.... [there exists] beyond all
question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported pub-
lic school system to aid religious groups.... "41 This type of coercion
constituted an impermissible violation of the First Amendment.
Four years later, the Court revisited the underpinnings of its
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Zorach v. Clauson.42 The
controversy in Zorach centered around a New York State education
law which permitted New York City public schools to release stu-
dents to attend religious classes upon written request of their par-
ents. Students who were not released were required to stay in the
classroom, and the students who were released were required to re-
port to the religious instruction.43 The facts in Zorach were distin-
guishable from the facts in McCollum in two respects: in Zorach, the
program did not involve religious instruction on public school prem-
ises, and there was no expenditure of public funds.
The Supreme Court held that this program did not violate the
First Amendment. The Court based its finding upon the lack of evi-
dence that "the system involves the use of coercion to get public
school students into religious classrooms."4 The Court added, how-
ever, that "[i]f in fact coercion were used, if it were established that
any one or more teachers were using their office to persuade or force
students to take the religious instruction, a wholly different case
39. Id. at 209. The gravamen in McCollum was the constitutionality of using tax-
supported public schools for sectarian religious instruction. Id. at 209-10.
40. The Court concluded that the use of tax-supported public schools and the com-
pulsory attendance laws for sectarian religious purposes clearly violated the First
Amendment. According to the Court: "The operation of the State's compulsory education
system thus assists and is integrated with the program of religious instruction carried on
by separate religious sects." Id. at 209. Further, "[tlhe State... affords sectarian groups
an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through use
of the State's compulsory public school machinery." Id. at 212. The McCollum Court held
that "[t]his is not separation of Church and State." Id.
41. Id. at 209-10.
42. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
43. Id. at 308.
44. Id. at 311. According to the Court, 'the school authorities are neutral in this re-
gard and do no more than release students whose parents so request." Id.
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would be presented."45
The distinction the Court made between its decisions in Zorach
and McCollum was based entirely on the element of governmental
coercion. In McCollum, the use of the state's compulsory education
system to further religious education was the factor that proved fa-
tal to the Illinois practice. In Zorach, the state's compulsory educa-
tion system was not used to further the aims of religious education
nor was any other form of governmental coercion employed. There-
fore, New York's practice survived constitutional scrutiny.
The Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence in its forma-
tive years was inextricably linked to the historical origins provided
by Madison and Jefferson and, as a result, rested its rational foun-
dations upon the coercion analysis. In order for a state practice to be
deemed a violation of the Establishment Clause, a showing of gov-
ernmental coercion or compulsion to religious belief or practice was
necessary. This analytical framework was witnessed in Everson,
McCollum and Zorach. In 1962, however, the Court began to reject
the coercion analysis in favor of a new framework.
II. REJECTION OF THE COERCION ANALYSIS
AND CREATION OF THE LEMON TEST
A. Rejection of the Coercion Analysis in Engel v. Vitale
The major shift in the Court's Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, which consisted of an outright rejection of the coercion
analysis and a movement toward the creation of a new analytical
framework, began in 1962 with the landmark decision Engel v. Vi-
tale.4" In reaching this decision, the Engel Court essentially ignored
all previous holdings which had been based upon a coercion theory,
and instead relied "largely upon abstract theories and... obiter
dicta-general and even casual statements in Supreme Court opin-
ions in previous cases, which... were unnecessary to the decision of
those cases and therefore are not valid as precedents binding the
Court in subsequent cases.""
In Engel, the Respondent Board of Education had directed the
school district's principal to ensure that a prayer, composed by the
New York State Board of Regents, was said each day in the class-
45. Id.
46. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For an in-depth analysis of the Engel decision, see JACOB
MARCELLUS Km, THE SUPREME COURT AND PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL (1963) and
CHARLES E. RICE, SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC PRAYER: THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT (1964).
47. RICE, supra note 46, at ix. According to Rice: "The Court quite naturally could
find no solid foundations in history and legal precedent upon which to base th[e] result [in
Engel]." Id.
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room with the teacher present.48 The parents of ten students brought
an action alleging that the prayer violated the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.49
The Supreme Court held that the New York Regents' Prayer
violated the Establishment Clause. 0 The Court, in dicta, then pro-
ceeded to eliminate the coercion analysis from its Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. According to the majority: "The Establish-
ment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon
any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by
the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether
[the] laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or
not."51
Engel denied that coercion was a necessary element in deter-
mining an Establishment Clause violation. As a result, Engel sev-
ered coercion-the basis upon which prior case law had been an-
chored 52-- from Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Justices in
Engel, however, may not have realized the ramifications of their de-
cision. Nevertheless, the decision in Engel set the Court's Estab-
48. The prayer's language was as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our de-
pendence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and
our Country."Engel, 370 U.S. at 422.
49. The Supreme Court noted that the New York State Court of Appeals found the
prayer to be constitutional "so long as the schools did not compel any pupil to join in the
prayer over his or his parents' objection." Id. at 423 (citing Engel v. Vitale, 176 N.E.2d
579, 581 (N.Y. 1961)). According to New York's highest court, since there was no finding
of compulsion on the part of the school, the practice would not be considered a violation of
the First Amendment Establishment Clause. The New York State Court of Appeals' deci-
sion was in line with earlier Supreme Court precedents which utilized a coercion analysis.
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 36. However, on appeal, the Supreme Court did not base
its decision on such precedents.
50. The Court noted that "[t]here can be no doubt that New York's state prayer pro-
gram officially establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer." Engel,
370 U.S. at 430. The Court added: "Neither the fact that the prayer [is] denominationally
neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve
to free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause. . . ." Id.
51. Id. Despite the Court's holding that coercion was not a necessary element in de-
termining the occurrence of an Establishment Clause violation, the Court went on to rec-
ognize that coercion was, in fact, implicit in Engel:
This is not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a particular form of
religious worship do not involve coercion of such individuals. When the power,
prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular relig-
ious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to
the prevailing officially approved religion is plain. But the purposes underlying
the Establishment Clause go much further than that.
Id. at 430-31.
52. See discussion supra part I.
53. It does not appear that the Engel Court entirely intended to place Establishment
Clause doctrine on the path it subsequently traveled. In a footnote, the Court stated:
There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent with
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lishment Clause jurisprudence on a path not previously envi-
sioned-a path the Court is still attempting to comprehend.
B. The Path to Lemon v. Kurtzman
Following the Engel decision, the Court no longer based its ju-
risprudence on the requirement that coercion must be shown to
prove that a state or federal practice violated the Establishment
Clause. In subsequent decisions, the Court developed novel strains
in its Establishment Clause doctrine which would ultimately be
conjoined to create a new test.
One year after Engel, the Supreme Court was presented with
another Establishment Clause question in Abington v. Schempp. 4 In
Schempp, the Court was asked to resolve the issue of whether a
state could statutorily require Bible readings or the recitation of the
Lord's Prayer in public school classrooms." The Court found that
the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express love
for our country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration of Ind-
ependence which contain references to the Deity or by singing officially es-
poused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme
Being, or with the fact that there are many manifestations in our public life of
belief in God. Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance
to the unquestioned religious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored
in this instance.
Engel, 370 U.S. at 435 n.21. It may, however, have served the Court well to place the
thoughts expressed in the footnote into the text of the decision, as footnotes are often
overlooked.
Public outcry with respect to the Engel decision was immediate. "A Connecticut
minister called Chief Justice Warren the anti-Christ, and from his pulpit he urged War-
ren's impeachment, in support of which six hundred seventy-four members of his congre-
gation joined in signing a petition." FENWICK, supra note 2, at 130 (footnote omitted). "A
South Carolina Congressman proposed a bill to require that the words 'In God We Trust'
be inscribed above the bench of the Supreme Court, to remind the justices that 'there is
an Authority higher than that of the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Id. (footnote
omitted). For a discussion of the approach taken by certain towns to completely defy the
Court's decision in Engel, see KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILIP E. HAAIMOND, THE
SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS (1971).
Additionally, 146 resolutions designed to permit prayer in public schools by Consti-
tutional amendment were introduced in Congress after the Supreme Court's decisions in
Engel and Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), which is discussed infra notes 54-59
and accompanying text. See PROPOSED AIENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION RELATING TO
SCHOOL PRAYERS, BIBLE READING, ETC.: A STAFF STUDY FOR THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1964).
54. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
55. Schempp was decided together with a companion case, Murray v. Curlett, 374
U.S. 203 (1963), which challenged a similar practice in Maryland. For an extensive in-
quiry into the Bible reading controversy, see DONALD E. BOLES, THE BIBLE, RELIGION AND
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1965).
The challenged Pennsylvania statute required that "[alt least ten verses from the
Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each
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the statutes required religious exercises in violation of the indi-
viduals' rights and were, therefore, violations of the Establishment
Clause. The Court based its finding on the concept of strict neutral-
ity: "Government [must] maintain strict neutrality [by] neither aid-
ing nor opposing religion.""6 The Court rejected the coercion analy-
sis, emphatically declaring that "a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause
violation need not be so attended."57 The Court instead articulated
that the Establishment Clause mandates that all legislation have a
secular purpose and prohibits any legislation which advances or in-
hibits religion."
The Schempp Court clearly deviated from all pre-Engel cases
which had been decided on the premise that coercion was an ele-
ment in determining whether an Establishment Clause violation
had occurred. 9 New foundations of jurisprudence, devoid of any re-
quirement of governmental coercion, were emerging.
The Court expounded upon its developing post-Engel jurispru-
dence in Walz v. Tax Commission.0 In Walz, a New York City Tax
Commission practice granting property tax exemptions to religious
organizations was challenged. 6 ' The Supreme Court upheld New
school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible
reading, upon the written request of his parent or guardian." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-
1516 (1992). The Schempp family, members of the Unitarian faith, brought the action al-
leging that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Mr. Schempp
stated that he had considered excusing his children from the religious exercise but
thought that this would impact negatively on his children's relationships with their
teachers and their peers. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205-08.
The challenged Maryland practice "provided for the holding of opening exercises in
the schools of the city, consisting primarily of the 'reading, without comment, of a chapter
in the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's Prayer.'" Id. at 211. This rule was amended
to provide that "[any child shall be excused from participating in the opening exercises or
from attending the opening exercises upon the written request of his parent or guardian."
Id. at n.4. The petitioners in Murray, Mrs. Murray and her son, were professed atheists
and argued that the statute, even as amended to allow for students to be excused, contra-
vened their First Amendment right of freedom of religion. Id. at 211-12.
56. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
57. Id. at 223.
58. Id. at 222. Writing for the majority, Justice Clark observed:
The test may be stated as follows: What are the purpose and the primary effect
of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Con-
stitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Id. (citations omitted).
59. See cases discussed supra part I.B.
60. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
61. According to the appellant, a real estate owner, such an exemption indirectly re-
quired him to make a contribution to religious bodies through his tax dollars and, there-
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York City's practice, finding that "[the legislative purpose of a prop-
erty tax exemption is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of
religion; it is neither sponsorship nor hostility."62 The Court went on
to state that "[d]etermining that the legislative purpose of tax ex-
emption is not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting re-
ligion does not end the inquiry, however. We must also be sure that
the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government entan-
glement with religion."63
After the Court's decision in Schempp, the Establishment
Clause test consisted of two distinct components. In order for a state
or federal government practice to remain consistent with the First
Amendment, it had to have both a secular legislative purpose and
remain neutral in its religious effect.64 Walz expounded upon that
test by adding a third component: The state or federal practice must
also not lead to "excessive government entanglement with relig-
ion."65 Conjoined, these two decisions provided the requisite criteria
upon which a new Establishment Clause framework of analysis
would be based.
C. Lemon and its Progeny
The post-Engel rejection of the coercion analysis culminated
with a formal articulation of a new analytical framework in Lemon
v. Kurtzman.6
At issue in Lemon was the constitutionality of the Rhode Island
Salary Supplement Act, which provided salary supplements to
teachers in nonpublic schools, 6 and the Pennsylvania Nonpublic
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which permitted superin-
tendents of public schools to purchase secular educational services
from nonpublic schools.68 Appellants brought suit alleging that these
statutes violated the Establishment Clause.69
The Supreme Court announced that "[elvery analysis in this
area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria devel-
fore, constituted a violation of the First Amendment prohibition against the es-
tablishment of religion. Id. at 667.
62. Id. at 672.
63. Id. at 674.
64. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
65. Wa/z, 397 U.S. at 674; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
66. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
67. Id. at 607.
68. Id. at 609.
69. The funds for the Pennsylvania program originated from a tax on horse and
harness racing. One of the appellants in Lemon argued that in addition to being a resi-
dent, a taxpayer, and a parent of a student, he had also purchased a race-track ticket and,
therefore, paid the tax which directly supported the Pennsylvania act. Id. at 611.
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oped by the Court over many years."10 The Court determined that
"[t]hree such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entan-
glement with religion.'" 71 The Court concluded that both statutes
were unconstitutional because the "cumulative impact of the entire
relationship arising under the statutes in each State involves ex-
cessive entanglement between government and religion."72 In
Lemon, the Court articulated a three-pronged test which would
guide Establishment Clause jurisprudence for the next twenty
years.
73
The Court clarified the application of the Lemon test in Stone v.
Graham.74 In Stone, a Kentucky statute, which required the posting
of the Ten Commandments in each public school classroom, was
challenged.75 Petitioners argued that the statute was in direct con-
flict with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.76
70. Id. at 612. Despite this declaration, the Court neglected to examine the criteria
that had been used by the Court prior to the Engel decision. These criteria are discussed
supra part I.B.
71. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). The Court combined the requirements articulated in Schempp, dis-
cussed supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text, with the additional criterion utilized in
Walz, discussed supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text, to create the Lemon test.
72. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614. Therefore, the Court found that the statutory scheme
violated the third prong of the Lemon test.
73. Simply stated, for a governmental practice to survive constitutional scrutiny, the
Lemon test required that the practice must: (1) have a secular legislative purpose; (2) not
enhance or inhibit religion; and (3) not foster excessive entanglement with religion. Id. at
612-13.
74. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
75. The statute provided:
(1) It shall be the duty of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, pro-
vided sufficient funds are available as provided in subsection (3) of this section,
to ensure that a durable, permanent copy of the Ten Commandments shall be
displayed on a wall in each public elementary and secondary school classroom in
the Commonwealth. The copy shall be sixteen (16) inches wide by twenty (20)
inches high.
(2) In small print below the last commandment shall appear a notation
concerning the purpose of the display, as follows: "The secular application of the
Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal
code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States."
(3) The copies required by this section shall be purchased with funds made
available through voluntary contributions made to the State Treasurer for the
purposes of this section.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 158.178 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992). By stating the secular pur-
pose of the posting of the Ten Commandments, the drafters of the Kentucky statute
hoped that it would pass the first prong of the Lemon test. FENWICK, supra note 2, at 179.
76. Stone, 449 U.S. at 39-40.
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In reaching its decision, the Court relied upon the three-
pronged Lemon test and definitively stated: "If a statute violates any
of these three principles, it must be struck down under the Estab-
lishment Clause."77 The Court concluded that "Kentucky's statute
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school
rooms had no secular legislative purpose, and [was] therefore un-
constitutional."7
The Lemon test was applied similarly five years later in
Wallace v. Jaffree79 a case which examined an Alabama statute
authorizing a period of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer.
0
The Wallace Court noted that "[w]hen the Court has been called
upon to construe the breadth of the Establishment Clause, it has ex-
amined the criteria developed over a period of many years."8' After
restating the three-part Lemon test, the Court concluded that "[iut is
the first of these three criteria that is most plainly implicated by
this case.... [No consideration of the second or third criteria is
necessary if a statute does not have a clearly secular purpose."" The
statute, therefore, violated the Establishment Clause.
One additional case, Edwards v. Aguillard,5 ' merits discussion
for its application of the Lemon test. The issue presented in Ed-
wards concerned the Louisiana Creationism Act, which required
that creation science and evolution science be given equal treatment
in schools.' Parents of students, teachers, and religious leaders
challenged the constitutionality of the Act.8" The Court ultimately
struck down the Act as violating the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.
The Court reached this conclusion through an application of the
77. Id. at 40-41.
78. Id. at 41. According to the per curiam opinion of the Court: "The pre-eminent
purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in
nature." Id. Therefore, the statute "serves no [permissible] educational function." Id. at
42.
79. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
80. For a discussion of Wallace, see David Lubecky, Silent Moments in Public
Schools: Wallace v. Jaffree, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 1405 (1985); Sylvia S. Penneys, And Now
ForA Moment of Silence: Wallace v. Jaffree, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 935 (1985).
81. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 55. As in Lemon, the Court neglected the criteria that had
been established prior to the Engel decision. Id.; see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
82. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56. The Court found that a moment of silence could not be
construed as having a secular legislative purpose. Id.
83. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). For a discussion of the Edwards decision, see Juliana S.
Moore, Note, The Edward's [sic] Decision: The End of Creationism in our Public Schools?,
21 AKRON L. REV. 255 (1987).
84. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 581. Under the Creationism Act, no school was required to
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Lemon test and noted that "[in this case, the Court must determine
whether the Establishment Clause was violated in the special con-
text of the public elementary and secondary school system." 6 The
Court found the statute violated the Establishment Clause under
the first and second prongs of Lemon, as it served "no clear secular
purpose,"" and its primary purpose advanced "a particular religious
belief.""8
Although firmly established as the mechanism for deciding
Establishment Clause questions, 9 the Lemon test began to be criti-
cized by scholars, critics, and observers of the Court. More impor-
tantly, criticism emerged from the Supreme Court.
H. DISSATISFACTION WITH THE LEMON TEST
Over time, Lemon proved to be a difficult framework to apply,
and its application was, at best, "unclear and unpredictable."90 As a
86. Id. at 583. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, commented:
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Es-
tablishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools. Families entrust pub-
lic schools with the education of their children, but condition their trust on the
understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance relig-
ious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or
her family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and their atten-
dance is involuntary.
Id. at 583-84.
87. Id. at 585.
88. Id. at 593.
89. Numerous decisions after Lemon were decided through the use of its three-
pronged analytical framework. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668 (1984); Doe v. Small, 934 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1991); Jones v. Clear Creek In-
dep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991); Southside Fair Hous. Comm. v. City of New
York, 928 F.2d 1336 (2d Cir. 1991); Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990); ACLU
v. County of Allegheny, 842 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1988); Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 827
F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987); Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir.
1985); Carpenter v. San Francisco, 803 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Smith v. Lind-
strom, 699 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Va. 1988); New Life Baptist Church Acad. v. Town of East
Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mass. 1987); Bollenbach v. Board of Educ., 659 F.
Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Van Zandt v. Thompson, 649 F. Supp. 583 (N.D. Ill. 1986);
ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1984). In fact, the Court used the Lemon test
in every Establishment Clause case except Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983),
which upheld a chaplain's invocation before the Nebraska Legislature on the basis of the
historical traditions surrounding such an activity.
90. Timothy V. Franklin, Squeezing the Juice Out of the Lemon Test, 72 EDUC. L.
REP. 1, 3 (1992). According to Franklin: "The literal language of Lemon has remained in-
tact but the meaning attached to each of the three test questions has fluctuated depend-
ing on which Justice wrote the Court's decision." Id. at 2 (footnote omitted). The various
ways in which the Lemon test has been applied and interpreted have resulted in decisions
which can only be described as contradictory. For example, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668 (1984), which is discussed infra note 116, and County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
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result, several Supreme Court Justices questioned whether Lemon
should be retained as the proper framework of analysis in deciding
Establishment Clause questions.
In Wallace v. Jaffree,9' Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent,
presented himself as a strong critic of Lemon. According to Justice
Rehnquist, the Lemon test "has no more grounding in the history of
the First Amendment than does the wall theory upon which it
rests."92 Justice Rehnquist criticized the metaphor of "[tihe 'wall of
separation between church and State'... [as] a metaphor based on
bad history... which has proved useless as a guide to judging."93
Therefore, "[it should be frankly and explicitly abandoned."94
In Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,95 Justice White reit-
erated his long-standing criticism of the Lemon test when he point-
edly stated:
As evidenced by my dissenting opinions in Lemon v. Kurtzman and
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, I have
long disagreed with the Court's interpretation and application of the Es-
tablishment Clause in the context of state aid to private schools. For the
reasons stated in those dissents, I am firmly of the belief that the Court's
decisions in these cases, like its decisions in Lemon and Nyquist, are "not
required by the First Amendment and [are] contrary to the long range in-
terests of the country."
96
573 (1989), which is discussed infra notes 111-28 and accompanying text, were both
decided under the Lemon framework, yet led to opposite conclusions. Lynch upheld the
constitutionality of a creche display, 465 U.S. at 685, while Allegheny invalidated a creche
display, 492 U.S. at 601-02.
91. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). Wallace is discussed supra notes 79-82 and accompanying
text. The majority in Wallace applied the Lemon test and held that a moment of silence
violated the first prong of the test, and, therefore, the Establishment Clause, since it did
not have a secular purpose. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 55-56.
92. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 107. Historically, the origin of the metaphor has been credited to Thomas
Jefferson. See supra note 25. This metaphor was first employed by the Supreme Court to
decide an Establishment Clause question in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878) (holding that laws prohibiting bigamy did not amount to an unconstitutional
"establishment" of religion).
94. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. 473 U.S. 373 (1985). At issue in Grand Rapids were two programs adopted by
the school district. Under these programs, classes taught by private school teachers were
offered in private school classrooms at the public taxpayers' expense, mainly at schools
the court characterized as "identifiably religious." Id. at 373. The majority in Grand
Rapids applied the Lemon test and concluded that both programs impermissibly involved
the government's support of sectarian religion. The programs had the primary effect of
advancing religion in violation of the second prong of the Lemon test and, therefore, vio-
lated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 397. For a general discussion of the Court's deci-
sion in Grand Rapids, see Thomas E. Elfere, Lead Us Not Into Confusion: Michigan
School Code v. Supreme Court Policy, 64 U. DET. L. REv. 225 (1986).
96. Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 400 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Committee of
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In addition to Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, Jus-
tice Scalia also has criticized the Court's continued use of the Lemon
test in deciding Establishment Clause cases.97 In Edwards v. Aguil-
lard ,98 Justice Scalia dissented, expressing his "doubt whether th[e]
'purpose' requirement of Lemon is a proper interpretation of the
Constitution."99 Recently, in a bitter dissent in Lee v. Weisman,'
Justice Scalia outwardly favored the "interment"1 1 of the Lemon
test.




Justice Kennedy emerged as a vehement critic of the Lemon test and
the principal spokesman for the readoption of the coercion analy-
sis.103 Justice Kennedy did "not wish to be seen as advocating, let
Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973)) (citations omitted) (alteration in origin-
al). Justice White also conveyed a similar message in Roemer v. Board of Public Works,
stating: "I am no more reconciled now to Lemon... than I was when it was de-
cided.... The threefold test of Lemon... imposes unnecessary, and... superfluous tests
for establishing 'when the State's involvement with religion passes the peril point' for
First Amendment purposes." 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (quoting
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 822).
97. See Jay Schlosser, Note, The Establishment Clause and Justice Scalia: What the
Future Holds for Church and State, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 380 (1988).
98. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). Edwards is discussed supra notes 83-88 and accompanying
text. The majority in Edwards utilized the Lemon framework to strike down a statutory
requirement that creation science and evolutionary science be given equal treatment in
the schools. The Court found such a legislative mandate to be without a secular purpose
and to advance religion in violation of the second prong of Lemon. As a result, the man-
date was prohibited by the Establishment Clause. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 597.
99. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Justice Scalia,
"pessimistic evaluation ... of the totality of Lemon is particularly applicable to the
'purpose' prong. . . ." Id. at 636. Justice Scalia concluded his dissent in Edwards by stat-
ing: "In the past we have attempted to justify our embarrassing Establishment Clause
jurisprudence on the ground that it 'sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibil-
ity.'... I think it time that we sacrifice some 'flexibility' for 'clarity and predictability.'
Abandoning Lemon's purpose test.., would be a good place to start." Id. at 639-40
(footnote omitted) (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444
U.S. 646 (1980)).
100. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). Lee is discussed infra part V. The majority in Lee essen-
tially ignored the Lemon test and declared school-sponsored invocations and benedictions
offered at high school commencement ceremonies unconstitutional because the Court
found that their use coerced student participation in a religious exercise. Lee, 112 S. Ct.
at 2661.
101. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See infra notes 155, 159 for a dis-
cussion of Justice Scalia's criticism of the majority opinion in Lee.
102. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). Allegheny is discussed infra notes 111-28 and accompany-
ing text. The Allegheny majority applied the Lemon test and upheld the constitutionality
of a menorah display while striking down a creche display under the second prong of the
Lemon test, since the principal or primary effect of the creche display was to advance re-
ligion. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601.
103. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659-63 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Justice Kennedy's opinion is discussed infra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
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alone adopting, [the Lemon] test as [the] primary guide in this diffi-
cult area.""4
Justice O'Connor also has voiced her dissatisfaction with the
Lemon test.' In Lynch v. Donnelly,1°6 Justice O'Connor proposed a
modification to Lemon, which has come to be known as the endorse-
ment test:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adher-
ence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the politi-
cal community. Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two prin-
cipal ways. One is excessive entanglement with religious institutions ....
The second and more direct infringement is government endorsement or
disapproval of religion.
10 7
Justice Blackmun cited Justice O'Connor's endorsement test
with approval in the majority opinion in County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union,""8 indicating that he too is in favor
of a modification of Lemon.
Despite its longstanding position as the test for determining
Establishment Clause violations, Lemon's applicability has been
questioned by several members of the Supreme Court. Many of the
Supreme Court Justices, in concurring and dissenting opinions in
the late 1980s, began to advocate the use of the coercion analysis as
an alternative to what they perceived as the unworkable Lemon
framework. 0
See Keith 0. McArtor, Comment, A Conservative Struggles with Lemon: Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy's Dissent in Allegheny, 26 TULSA L.J. 107 (1990).
104. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
105. See Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion
Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight,
64 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (1986); W. Scott Simpson, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's
Proposed Modifications of the Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986
B.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1986).
106. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Lynch is discussed infra note 116. The Lynch majority up-
held a creche display as constitutional based upon the holiday environment in which it
was displayed.
107. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test eliminates the first prong of the Lemon test, which requires
that a governmental practice demonstrate a secular purpose. The endorsement test, how-
ever, essentially retains the second and third prongs of Lemon, which are concerned with
endorsement-government's advancement of and excessive entanglement with religion.
108. 492 U.S. 573, 575 (1989).
109. As evidenced in the judicial opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Blackmun, Justice White, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy, discon-
tentment prevailed over the Court's continued use of the Lemon framework. In the late
1980s, the coercion analysis began to reemerge.
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IV. REEMERGENCE OF THE COERCION ANALYSIS
Although rejected by the Supreme Court for- some time,11° the
coercion analysis reappeared in an opinion written by Justice
Kennedy in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union."'
The case considered the constitutionality of two holiday displays"2
in Pittsburgh: a creche"' and a menorah."4 The American Civil Lib-
erties Union and residents of the city of Pittsburgh initiated an ac-
tion to ban the displays in question on the grounds that they consti-
tuted an establishment of religion prohibited by the First Amend-
ment.
115
110. See discussion supra part II.A-B (recounting the Court's denial that coercion
must exist in order for a government practice to violate the Establishment Clause).
111. 492 U.S. 573, 655-79 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Allegheny was heard together with Chabad v. American Civil Liberties Union and
City of Pittsburgh v. American Civil Liberties Union. For analysis of Allegheny and its
companion cases, see Richard A. LaCroix, County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liber-
ties Union: How the Bench Stole Christmas, 25 NEw ENG. L. REV. 523 (1990); David 0.
Stewart, Rules of Yule, 75 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1989, at 50.
112. Although this case does not involve an Establishment Clause violation within
school environs, it is imperative to undertake an examination of the decision, as the
analysis advocated by Justice Kennedy in Allegheny is central to subsequent Establish-
ment Clause cases dealing with religion in the school context, particularly Lee v. Weis-
man, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), which is discussed infra part V.
113. A creche is a visual representation of the Bethlehem nativity scene after the
birth of Jesus Christ. It depicts the Virgin Mary, Joseph and the Christ child, as well as
animals, shepherds and wise men. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 580 (citing Luke 2:1-21; Mat-
thew 2:1-11).
The creche in Allegheny was owned by the Holy Name Society, a Roman Catholic or-
ganization, and was displayed annually on the staircase of the Allegheny County Court-
house. Id. at 579. At the pinnacle of the creche display was an angel holding a banner
which read: "Gloria in Excelsis Deo," meaning "Glory to God in the Highest." Id. at 580 &
n.5. As the Court noted: "It is unlikely that an observer standing at the bottom of the
Grand Staircase would be able to read the text of the angel's banner from that distance,
but might be able to do so from a closer vantage point." Id. at n.5.
114. A menorah is a nine-branched candelabrum used during the Jewish festival of
Chanukah to celebrate the Macabees' rededication of the Temple of Jerusalem after re-
capturing it from the Greeks. Id. at 582-83 nn.9 & 14-20. "Chanukah is the annual Jewish
holiday that falls closest to Christmas Day each year." Id. at 582.
In Allegheny, an 18-foot menorah was displayed at the entrance of City Hall next to
the city's 45-foot Christmas tree. The menorah, although owned by Chabad, a local Jew-
ish organization, was "stored, erected, and removed [annually] by the city." Id. at 587.
115. The district court denied the respondents' request that the city and county be
enjoined from displaying such religious items. Relying on Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984), which is discussed infra note 116, the court held that the creche and the menorah
were simply part of a holiday display. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
creche and menorah were patently Christian and Judaic symbols, and, therefore, their
display by the city and county violated the second prong of the Lemon test because the
practice's principal effect enhanced religion. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 842 F.2d 655
(3d Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court granted certiorari. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 488
U.S. 816 (1988).
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The Supreme Court majority declared that the creche display
was unconstitutional under the second prong of the Lemon test, be-
cause the principal effect of the display was to advance religion. 116
The Court, however, sustained the constitutionality of the menorah.
The Court found that "the menorah's message is not exclusively re-
ligious."" Additionally, the menorah in Allegheny was displayed
near a Christmas tree, creating a holiday setting similar to the one
upheld in Lynch v. Donnelly."'
Justice Kennedy's opinion," 9 concurring in part and dissenting
in part, 20 discussed the coercion analysis at length and advocated
its adoption as a replacement for the Lemon test.12' According to
Justice Kennedy, "[olur cases disclose two limiting principles: gov-
ernment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any re-
ligion or its exercise; and it may not.., give direct benefits to relig-
ion in such a degree that it in fact 'establishes a [state] religion or
religious faith .... 22 Justice Kennedy stated further:
116. The Court found that Allegheny County had "chosen to celebrate Christmas in
a way that ha[d] the effect of endorsing a patently Christian message: Glory to God for
the birth of Jesus Christ." Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601. The Court distinguished this case
from Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), which upheld the constitutionality of a
creche display. In Lynch, the Supreme Court found a creche display constitutional based
upon the environment in which it was located. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680. The display in
Lynch consisted of a series of figures and objects such as a Santa house, reindeer, candy
canes, carolers, and a large banner which read: "Season's Greetings." Id. at 671. The
Lynch majority found that the government was simply sponsoring a celebration of the
holiday season. Id. at 681. In Allegheny, however, there was only the presence of a creche,
constituting a solely religious message impermissible under the First Amendment. "Here,
unlike in Lynch, nothing in the context of the display detracts from the creche's religious
message." Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598.
117. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 613. In the words of the majority: "The menorah is the
primary visual symbol for the holiday that, like Christmas, has both religious and secular
dimensions." Id. at 613-14. The Court analogized the display of the menorah to a display
of a Christmas tree. Id. at 616. A Christmas tree at one time carried with it religious con-
notations derived from the Christian traditions. Id. However, today it simply symbolizes
the secular celebration of Christmas. Id. at 617. Likewise, the menorah signifies "that
Christmas is not the only traditional way of observing the winter-holiday season." Id.
118. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Lynch is discussed supra note 116.
119. Writing his first Establishment Clause opinion, Justice Kennedy was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Scalia. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
120. According to Justice Kennedy, the majority's "view of the Establishment Clause
reflects an unjustified hostility toward religion, a hostility inconsistent with our history
and our precedents." Id.
121. Justice Kennedy commented that "[plersuasive criticism of Lemon has
emerged," and that a "[s]ubstantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be
in order." Id. at 656. Although he stated that such substantial revision was not necessary
to decide Allegheny, Justice Kennedy, in effect, set the stage for a future revision of the
Court's Establishment Clause doctrine.
122. Id. at 659 (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).
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These two principles, while distinct, are not unrelated, for it would be dif-
ficult indeed to establish a religion without some measure of more or less
subtle coercion, be it in the form of taxation to supply the substantial
benefits that would sustain a state-established faith, direct compulsion to
observance, or governmental exhortation to religiosity that amounts in
fact to proselytizing.
12
Justice Kennedy reintroduced the coercion analysis in much
the same form as it existed prior to Engel v. Vitale. 24 He readily ac-
knowledged that the coercion analysis had been used consistently in
cases decided before Engel;m yet, he was also aware that "some of
our recent cases reject the view that coercion is the sole touchstone
of an Establishment Clause violation." 26 For Justice Kennedy, how-
ever, "[a]bsent coercion, the risk of infringement of religious liberty
by passive or symbolic accommodation is minimal."'27 With respect
to the facts in Allegheny, Justice Kennedy believed that the presence
of both the creche and the menorah in public displays was constitu-
tional since coercion was absent.
2
With his opinion in Allegheny, Justice Kennedy revitalized the
coercion analysis-an Establishment Clause framework which had
123. Id. at 659-60.
124. 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see discussion supra part I (presenting the origins of the
coercion analysis and its application by the Court up to its decision in Engel). The major-
ity opinion in Engel, which is discussed supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text, severed
the principle of coercion from Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
125. Justice Kennedy admitted:
It is no surprise that without exception we have invalidated actions that
further the interests of religion through the coercive power of government....
The freedom to worship as one pleases without government interference or op-
pression is the great object of both the Establishment and the Free Exercise
Clauses. Barring all attempts to aid religion through government coercion goes
far toward attainment of this object.
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660 (citations omitted).
126. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 51, 57.
127. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662. Thus, Justice Kennedy indicates that coercion is the
primary factor to be considered in Establishment Clause analysis to determine if religious
liberty has been infringed.
128. Id. at 655, 659-60. According to Justice Kennedy:
There is no suggestion here that the government's power to coerce has
been used to further the interests of Christianity or Judaism in any way. No one
was compelled to observe or participate in any religious ceremony or activ-
ity... The creche and the menorah are purely passive symbols of religious
holidays. Passersby who disagree with the message conveyed by these displays
are free to ignore them, or even to turn their backs, just as they are free to do
when they disagree with any other form of government speech.
There is no realistic risk that the creche and the menorah represent an ef-
fort to proselytize or are otherwise the first step down the road to an establish-
ment of religion.
Id. at 664.
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been neglected by the Court for many years. Justice Kennedy's
opinion was consistent with the intent of the Framers, including
Madison and Jefferson, and the Court's early jurisprudence prior to
Engel.
In 1990, Justice Kennedy again returned to a discussion of the
coercion analysis in Board of Education v. Mergens.12 9 Mergens in-
volved a local high school policy which allowed students to partici-
pate in recognized extracurricular groups that met after classes on
school premises. 30 Bridget Mergens requested permission to form a
Christian club.131 Her request was denied by the school on the
grounds that such a group would constitute an establishment of re-
ligion which would violate the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court upheld Bridget Mergens' right to form a
Christian club and to meet on the same terms and conditions as ex-
isting student clubs. This decision was based upon the determina-
tion that the school's refusal constituted a denial of equal access
guaranteed by federal law.
32
Justice Kennedy concurred in part in the opinion and concurred
in the judgment of the Court.133 Although Justice Kennedy agreed
that the school's compliance with the Equal Access Act would not be
considered to violate the Establishment Clause, he reached this
conclusion by applying a different analytical framework.134 Justice
129. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). For treatment of the Court's decision in Mergens, see
Frank R. Jimenez, Beyond Mergens: Ensuring Equality of Student Religious Speech Un-
der the Equal Access Act, 100 YALE L.J. 2149 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Students
Won!; The Supreme Court Enforces the Equal Access Act, QUARTERLY, Summer 1990, at
17.
130. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 231. Some of the extracurricular groups were, for exam-
ple, the Band, the Future Business Leaders of America, the Speech and Debate Club, the
Math Club, the Scuba Club, the Peer Advocates Service Program, the Photography Club,
and the Chess Club. Id. at 253-58.
131. The purpose of the club would have been to read the Bible and pray. Member-
ship would have been voluntary and open to all students regardless of religious affiliation.
Furthermore, there would have been no faculty sponsor of the group. Id. at 232.
132. Id. at 253. The Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1984), was designed
to ensure that student groups were afforded equal access within the school system. The
Act provides, in relevant part, that a school allowing "noncurriculum related student
groups" to meet may not lawfully discriminate against groups "on the basis of the relig-
ious, political, philosophical or other content of their speech." 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a). Con-
gress enacted the Equal Access Act in response to the confusion which existed over the
role of any type of religious speech or activity in the schools. The Act attempted to clarify
the proper role of religion by accommodating both the students' interest in discussing
their beliefs and the officials' interest in seeking to avoid religious endorsement. Jimenez,
supra note 129, at 2150.
133. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 258 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment). Justice Kennedy was joined by Justice Scalia. Id.
134. In his opinion in Mergens, Justice Kennedy stated that his "view of the analytic
premise that controls the establishment question differs from that employed by the plu-
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Kennedy felt it was important to determine first whether the Act
violated either of two principles. For Justice Kennedy, the Act would
be constitutionally valid if it did not confer benefits directly to a re-
ligion, and more importantly, if it did not coerce any students to par-
ticipate in a religious activity.'35 In Justice Kennedy's view, the ab-
sence of any governmental coercion was demonstrated by the fact
that neither principle was violated by the Act.' Justice Kennedy
went on to discuss the coercion analysis and the careful attention
that must be paid within the school context to determine whether
governmental coercion is indeed involved. 137 Justice Kennedy main-
tained that since no such governmental coercion existed, Bridget
Mergens' request to form a Christian club should be granted.1
38  -
In Mergens, Justice Kennedy again utilized the coercion analy-
sis. In so doing, he attempted to influence the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence toward a foundation aligned once again with
rality." Id.
135. As Justice Kennedy discussed:
The accommodation of religion mandated by the Act is a neutral one, and in the
context of this case it suffices to inquire whether the Act violates either one of
two principles. The first is that the government cannot "give direct benefits to
religion in such a degree that it in fact 'establishes a [state] religion or religious
faith, or tends to do so.'". . . The second principle controlling the case now be-
fore us, in my view, is that the government cannot coerce any student to par-
ticipate in a religious activity.
Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
These are the same two principles which Justice Kennedy articulated in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). See supra text accompanying notes 122-23. Of
these two principles, Justice Kennedy relied primarily upon the second principle, that a
governmental practice must not be coercive, to reach his decision. Mergens, 496 U.S. at
260 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
136. As Justice Kennedy opined:
Nothing on the face of the Act or in the facts of the case as here presented dem-
onstrates that enforcement of the statute will result in the coercion of any stu-
dent to participate in a religious activity. The Act does not authorize school
authorities to require, or even to encourage, students to become members of a
religious club or to attend a club's meetings; the meetings take place while
school is not in session, and the Act does not compel any school employee to
participate in, or to attend, a club's meetings or activities.
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 261 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment)
(citations omitted).
137. Justice Kennedy maintained that evidence of government coercion within the
school environment can be readily discerned:
The inquiry with respect to coercion must be whether the government imposes
pressure upon a student to participate in religious activity. This inquiry, of
course, must be undertaken with sensitivity to the special circumstances that
exist in a secondary school where the line between voluntary and coerced par-
ticipation may be difficult to draw.
Id. at 261-62.
138. See id. at 262.
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the Framers' intent and thus with the Court's early Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. After the decisions in Allegheny and Mergens,
discussion increased concerning the use of the coercion analysis as
the primary basis upon which Establishment Clause questions were
to be decided. 13 9 In fact, many Court observers thought that the
Lemon test would be explicitly overruled and the coercion analysis
would reclaim its place in Establishment Clause jurisprudence in
Lee v. Weisman.
140
V. LEE V. WEISMAT
A. Exposition
One of the most widely discussed cases of recent Supreme
Court terms, Lee v. Weisman," involved the incorporation of invo-
cations and benedictions into high school graduation ceremonies.1
2
The appellee in Lee, Deborah Weisman, graduated from Nathan
Bishop Middle School in June of 1989.' Her graduation ceremony
139. Observers predicted that the Supreme Court would reconsider its approach to
interpreting the religion clauses of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Michael W. McCon-
nell, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Where is the Supreme Court Heading?,
187 CATH. LAW. 187 (1988); Nat Hentoff, Will the Wall Come Tumbling Down?, WASH.
POST, Dec. 21, 1991, at A19.
140. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). Prior to the decision in Lee, observers speculated that a
significant change was likely to occur. See Richard Carelli, Next Supreme Court Decision
Could Mean Major Changes in Law, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 4, 1992, at A2; Ruth Marcus,
Justices Accept Prayer Case that Poses New Constitutional Test for Religion, WASH. POST,
Mar. 19, 1991, at A14.
141. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
142. Prior to the decision in Lee, several lower courts had discussed the constitu-
tionality of invocations and benedictions. In the following cases, the lower courts held
that the deliverance of a religious invocation or benediction at public school sponsored
events to which the public was invited or admitted violated the Establishment Clause:
Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
2431 (1990); Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch., 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987); Weisman
v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I.), affd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), affd, 112 S. Ct. 2649
(1992); Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist., 608 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Doe
v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., 563 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Tex. 1982). In the following cases, the
lower courts held that invocations and benedictions at school sponsored events to which
the public is invited, while religious in nature, did not violate the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment: Grossberg v. Deusebic, 380 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wood
v. Mt. Lebanon Township Sch. Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Weist v. Mt.
Lebanon Sch. Dist., 320 A.2d 362 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1974).
It was evident from these conflicting results that the lower courts desperately
needed guidance from the Supreme Court in this area. The Supreme Court's grant of cer-
tiorari in Lee provided the opportunity for such guidance.
143. The "real origins" of the Lee case stemmed from the 1986 graduation of Merith
Weisman, a sister of Deborah Weisman, from the Nathan Bishop Middle School. As mem-
bers of the Jewish faith, the Weismans objected to the speaker's thanking Jesus Christ
for the accomplishments of the students. Their objections, however, were not noted. Three
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was held on school grounds and included an invocation and bene-
diction delivered by Rabbi Leslie Gutterman.'4 Rabbi Gutterman
began his invocation by addressing a deity and concluded with an
"Amen."145 The benediction opened in a similar fashion with an ap-
peal to God's blessings and concluded with an "Amen."46 The invo-
cation and benediction taken together contained "a total of 252
words, with two references to 'God' and one reference to the
'Lord.!"
47
years later when the parents learned that a Rabbi would be offering prayers at the
graduation of their younger daughter, Deborah, they again objected and this time took
their case to the Supreme Court. James E. Wood, Jr., Ceremonial Prayer at Public School
Graduations: Lee v. Weisman, 34 J. CHURCH & ST. 7, 8 (1992).
144. Rabbi Leslie Gutterman was the Rabbi of the Temple Beth El in Providence.
Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2652. The principal of the school, Robert Lee, had given Rabbi Gutter-
man a copy of "Guidelines for Civic Occasions" and advised him that the prayers should
be nonsectarian. Id. However, the Weismans objected that "the prayers could be offensive
and divisive, all the more so in a school system such as Providence in which more than
half of the students are blacl, Hispanic, or Asian and many are Buddhist, Muslim, or
Jewish." Wood, supra note 143, at 8.
145. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2652-53. Rabbi Gutterman's invocation was as follows:
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of
minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women grow
up to enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow
up to guard it.
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may partici-
pate, for its court system where all may seek justice we thank You. May those
we honor this morning always turn to it in trust.
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan
Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to share it.
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are
our hope for the future, be richly fulfilled.
Amen.
Id.
146. Id. at 2653. Rabbi Gutterman's benediction was as follows:
0 God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for
learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement.
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important
milestone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who
helped prepare them.
The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future, help them to
understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We must
each strive to fulfill what You require of us all: To do justly, to love mercy, to
walk humbly.
We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and allow-
ing us to reach this special, happy occasion.
Amen.
Id.
147. Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo, High School Prayers at Graduation:
Will the Supreme Court Pronounce the Benediction?, 69 EDUC. L. REP. 189, 191 (1991).
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Deborah Weisman subsequently became a high school student
at Classical High School, and it appeared that invocations and
benedictions would again be included as part of her high school's
graduation program. In July 1989, Deborah's father, Daniel Weis-
man, filed an amended complaint seeking a permanent injunction
barring the school district from inviting clergy to deliver invocations
and benedictions at all future graduations.
Utilizing the Lemon test, the District Court for Rhode Island
held that the inclusion of invocations and benedictions in public
school graduation ceremonies violated the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment, because their use served to advance relig-
ion.148 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the deci-
sion of the district court as "sound and pellucid... [and saw] no rea-
son to elaborate further."4 9 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.'50
Justice Kennedy authored the opinion for the Supreme Court.15'
Justice Kennedy, who had suggested just three years prior in Allegh-
eny that the existing Establishment Clause doctrine may need to be
reconsidered by the Court,5 2 began the opinion for the majority by
pointedly stating: "This case does not require us to revisit the diffi-
cult questions dividing us in recent cases.... " 15 3 Consequently, the
Court declined the invitation of petitioners and amicus for the
United StatesM to reconsider its decision in Lemon.'55
148. The court considered the invocations and benedictions to be advancements of
religion because they created an identification of school with religious practice, prohibited
by the second prong of the Lemon test. Since the practice of including invocations and
benedictions failed to survive constitutional scrutiny under the second prong of the
Lemon test, the court felt it unnecessary to discuss the first and third prongs of the test.
Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I.), affd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), affd, 112 S.
Ct. 2649 (1992).
149. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), affd, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
Judge Bownes, although joining in the decision of the court, wrote a separate concurrence
in which he stated that the invocations and benedictions offered here violated not only
the second prong of the Lemon test, but also the remaining two prongs of the Lemon test.
Id. at 1094-95. Judge Campbell dissented on the grounds that "First Amendment values
are more richly and satisfactorily served by inclusiveness than by barring altogether a
practice most people wish to have preserved." Id. at 1099 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
150. Lee v. Weisman, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
151. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor
and Justice Souter joined Justice Kennedy in the majority. Id.
152. See supra note 121.
153. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. There had been a significant division on the Court over
the usefulness of the Lemon test. See discussion supra part III.
In the opinion of the Family Research Council, the fact that Justice Kennedy
authored the majority opinion in Lee simply added "insult to injury." Family Group, supra
note 15.
154. Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the
United States asking the Court to abandon the Lemon test and formulate a new Estab-
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In writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy rested his argu-
ment on the element of coercion. According to Justice Kennedy: "It is
beyond dispute that... government may not coerce anyone to sup-
port or participate in religion or its exercise.... ."' Justice Kennedy
noted a "potential for divisiveness ... in the secondary school envi-
ronment where.., subtle coercive pressures exist and where [a]
student had no real alternative which would have allowed her to
avoid the fact or appearance of participation."5 ' Justice Kennedy
lishment Clause framework of analysis based on a coercion theory. See Brief for The
United States as Amicus Curiae, Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1991) (No. 90-
1014) [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
The Solicitor General has traditionally played a very important role with respect to
the Court and has often been referred to as the "tenth justice." The Solicitor General
provides the Supreme Court legal counsel in difficult areas of the law, and "the Justices
are likely to give serious consideration to his arguments." T. Page Johnson, Lee v. Weis-
man: "The Tenth Justice" Takes Aim at the Lemon Test, 67 EDUC. L. REP. 1021, 1021
(1990). Some scholars believed, therefore, that the Court, upon the advice of the Solicitor
General, would overrule Lemon and adopt a new Establishment Clause test based on co-
ercion in Lee. Id.
Strong urgings were presented by the Bush administration, via the Solicitor General,
to overrule Lemon in order to provide for a greater accommodation of religion in Ameri-
can society. See Marcia Coyle, New Wings Sprout on High Court, NATL L.J., July 6, 1992,
at 1; Marcia Coyle, Not Just A Prayer, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 11, 1991, at 1; Aaron Epstein,
Justices Ban Prayers at Public School Graduations, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 25, 1992, at
Al; Tony Mauro, A Step Bach from Redoing Religion Law, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 11, 1991, at
8.
155. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. Despite Justice Kennedy's declaration that the decision
in Lemon need not be reconsidered and would remain precedent in this area, he failed to
apply the Lemon test to reach a conclusion in Lee. In a scathing dissent, Justice Scalia at-
tacked Justice Kennedy: "The Court today demonstrates the irrelevance of Lemon by es-
sentially ignoring it, and the interment of that case may be the one happy byproduct of
the Court's otherwise lamentable decision." Id. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
Commenting on the discord between Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia, Harvard
Law Professor Laurence Tribe observed:
Justice Scalia, in particular, has been rather sharp tongued and is getting more
and more so. I think what's happening is in some ways when the stakes are re-
duced, the voices are increased. I mean, people are yelling at one another when
they are really much closer together. It's a bit silly.
Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, June 24, 1992).
156. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. Justice Kennedy argued that the inspiration for the Es-
tablishment Clause lay in "the lesson that in the hands of government what might begin
as a tolerant expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce."
Id. at 2658.
157. Id. at 2656. The Court held that Deborah Weisman did not have any viable al-
ternatives. The voluntary option of not attending the ceremony did not excuse the coer-
cion.
Everyone knows that in our society and in our culture high school graduation is
one of life's most significant occasions.... Attendance may not be required by
official decree, yet it is apparent that a student is not free to absent herself from
the graduation exercise in any real sense of the term "voluntary," for absence
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concluded that "[t]he State's involvement in the school prayers
challenged today violates these central principles."158 The majority,
under Justice Kennedy, found "that prayer exercises in public
schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion."" 9
In his final analysis, Justice Kennedy stated that "[tihe sole
question presented is whether a religious exercise may be conducted
at a graduation ceremony in circumstances where, as we have found,
young graduates who object are induced to conform." 60 Justice
Kennedy concluded: "No holding by this Court suggests that a school
can persuade or compel a student to participate in a religious exer-
cise. That is being done here, and it is forbidden by the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment."' The ultimate holding in
Lee rested upon coercion-government cannot persuade or compel
an individual to religious practice.
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurrence in Lee16 2 reaf-
would require forfeiture of those intangible benefits which have motivated the
student through youth and all her high school years.
Id. at 2659. But cf. Brief for the United States, supra note 154, at 18 (arguing that the
voluntary nature of the commencement exercises eliminated any form of coercion).
158. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
159. Id. at 2658. Justice Kennedy emphasized that the students may have felt psy-
chologically coerced to stand and pray during the ceremony. Id. at 2659. This is the type
of coercion to which Justice Kennedy seems to be referring throughout the opinion in Lee;
this type of coercion is a variation on the form of coercion originally examined by Justice
Kennedy in Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573, 655-64, which is discussed supra notes 119-28 and
accompanying text, and Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 258-62, which is discussed supra notes
133-38 and accompanying text. By including psychological coercion in its analysis, the Lee
Court significantly expanded the previous coercion analysis articulated by Justice
Kennedy.
In dissent, Justice Scalia attacked Justice Kennedy's reasoning. Justice Scalia ar-
gued that "[als its instrument of destruction, the bulldozer of its social engineering, the
Court invents a boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion,
which promises to do for the Establishment Clause what the Durham rule did for the in-
sanity defense." Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also sarcas-
tically referred to the majority's opinion as "the Court's psycho-journey." Id. at 2684
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Apparently, Justice Scalia is primarily attacking Justice
Kennedy's variation on the coercion analysis developed in Lee, rather than a fundamental
conceptual framework based on coercion; Justice Scalia has agreed with Justice Kennedy
that the coercion analysis presents a more workable model than Lemon for deciding Es-
tablishment Clause cases. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 258 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, joined by Scalia, J.); County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Scalia, J.).
When asked if this "is a case of what they call the narcissism of small differences,"
Mr. Jay Sukulow, co-counsel for the school district in Lee v. Weisman, stated: "I think
some of it is just small differences in approach and not basically underlying theory
[which] they agree on .... " Crossfire, supra note 155.
160. Lee, 12 S. Ct. at 2661.
161. Id.
162. Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor joined in Justice Blackmun's concur-
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firming Lemon and arguing that it was not necessary to show gov-
ernmental coercion or governmental preference for a particular re-
ligion in order to determine whether the Establishment Clause had
been violated. 1 3 Justice Souter also concurred in the decision of the
Lee Court. He found no adequate historical basis for abandoning the
Court's precedents in this area of the law and was, therefore, in
agreement that Lemon need not be reconsidered."6 Justice Souter
also asserted that state coercion was not a necessary element of Es-
tablishment Clause doctrine. 65
Justice Scalia dissented in Lee and was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice White and Justice Thomas. 66 The dissenters ar-
gued that the graduation prayers were consistent with our nation's
general history and tradition of prayer at public ceremonies.'
Thus, the coercion analysis found its way back into a majority
opinion of the Court. Justice Kennedy's prior opinions advocating a
coercion analysis failed to garner a majority; however, in Lee, Jus-
tice Kennedy was able to marshall support and espouse his views
rence. Id. at 2661 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 2664.
164. Justice Souter reasoned that "[i]n barring the state from sponsoring generically
Theistic prayers where it could not sponsor sectarian ones, we hold true to a line of
precedent from which there is no adequate historical case to depart." Id. at 2667 (Souter,
J., concurring).
165. Id. at 2671-76. According to Justice Souter: "Our precedents may not always
have drawn perfectly straight lines. They simply cannot, however, support the position
that a showing of coercion is necessary to a successful Establishment Clause claim." Id. at
2672. But cf discussion supra part I.B (illustrating the manner in which coercion had, in
fact, been a necessary element in Establishment Clause analysis).
Additionally, Justice Souter asserted that he joined "the whole of the Court's opinion,
and fully agree[d] that prayers at public school graduation ceremonies indirectly coerce
religious observance." Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2667. Since Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor
joined Justice Souter's concurrence, they would, therefore, by extension also have joined
in the "whole of the Court's opinion." It is questionable, however, whether Justice
Stevens, Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter did, in fact, join in "the whole" of Justice
Kennedy's opinion. Justice Kennedy advocates the coercion analysis, and yet these three
Justices-Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Souter-assert in concurrence
that coercion is not a requisite element in proving an Establishment Clause violation. Id.
166. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2678 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. In dissent, Justice Scalia argued:
[T]he long standing American tradition of prayer at official ceremonies displays
with unmistakable clarity that the Establishment Clause does not forbid the go-
vernment to accommodate it.
The narrow context of the present case involves a community's celebration
of one of the milestones in its young citizens' lives, and it is a bold step for this
Court to seek to banish from that occasion, and from thousands of similar cele-
brations throughout this land, the expression of gratitude to God that a major-
ity of the community wishes to make.
Id. at 2686.
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concerning coercion in a majority decision. 6 s The decision provides a
foundation upon which Establishment Clause jurisprudence, based
on the element of coercion, may be developed in subsequent cases.169
B. Analysis
The decision in Lee is an anomaly in two respects. 170 First, the
majority in Lee declined the invitation of petitioners to reconsider its
decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 17 yet failed to employ the Lemon
test to determine the constitutionality of invocations and benedic-
tions at high school commencement exercises. 7 1 Consequently, the
current, as well as future, status of the Lemon framework remains
unclear, and the proper role for the Lemon test, if there remains one
at all in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, has yet to be deter-
mined.173 Second, the manner in which the Justices aligned them-
168. This fact takes on even greater significance when one examines Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Allegheny. In Allegheny, Justice Kennedy berated the
majority for basing its decision on a "precedent" that was embodied in a concurring opin-
ion, written by Justice O'Connor in Lynch. Justice Kennedy stated: "It has never been my
understanding that a concurring opinion 'suggest[ing] a clarification of our.., doctrine'
could take precedence over an opinion joined in its entirety by five Members of the
Court." County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
Taking this argument to its logical extension, it can be concluded that Justice Kennedy
knew that his views with respect to the coercion analysis would not bear significantly on
Establishment Clause doctrine unless they were asserted in a majority decision. Justice
Kennedy seized the opportunity presented in Lee to espouse these views in a majority decision.
169. According to Justice Kennedy's analysis, this majority opinion will carry prece-
dential weight over the concurrences in Lee of Justice Blackmun and Justice Souter,
which asserted that coercion is not a necessary element in determining whether an Es-
tablishment Clause violation has occurred. See supra note 168.
170. It has been posited that "[t]he... observer who seeks to make sense of the Su-
preme Court's rulings in establishment clause cases is in for a shock." A.E. DICK HOWARD
ET AL., CHURCH, STATE, AND POLITICS: FINAL REPORT OF THE 1981 CHIEF JUSTICE EARL
WARREN CONFERENCE ONADVOCACYIN THE UNITED STATES 21 (Jaye B. Hensel ed., 1981).
171. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see supra note 155 and accompanying text.
172. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655-61; see infra note 173.
173. The majority in Lee did not explicitly reject the Lemon test. However, "given its
conspicuous absence in the majority opinion," it is questionable whether Lemon remains
the law of the land. Martha M. McCarthy, Is the Wall of Separation Still Standing?, 77
EDUC. L. REP. 1, 8 (1992). Instead, "this standard will likely fade quietly into establish-
ment clause history." Id. at 8.
Further, "by writing an opinion that ignored the Lemon framework and focused on
the coercive effects of government activities, the Court... moved toward the adoption of
a coercion test .... " The Supreme Court, 1991-Leading Cases, 106 HARv. L. REV. 163,
260 (1992) [hereinafter Leading Cases]. The Court, if it had applied the Lemon frame-
work, could have reached the same result in Lee. The graduation prayers would have con-
stituted "excessive entanglement" between church and state prohibited by the third prong
of the Lemon test. Id. at 263. "This substantial effort to avoid reliance on Lemon suggests
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selves defies logic when one carefully examines each Justice's ideo-
logical disposition toward the coercion analysis prior to Lee. These
two idiosyncratic aspects of the Court's decision in Lee need to be re-
solved-the Supreme Court must officially overrule Lemon and re-
adopt the coercion analysis in order to come full circle. I
An indication of Lemon's fate can be gleaned from 'examining
the Supreme Court. Currently, 74 four Justices are highly critical of
the Lemon test: Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice
Scalia and Justice Kennedy.'75 In addition to the more vocal critics of
Lemon, Justice Blackmun and Justice O'Connor have previously ad-
vocated a modification of the Lemon test.76
Due to their recent elevation to the Court, the Establishment
Clause jurisprudence of Justice Souter and Justice Thomas remains
highly speculative. Lee was the first decision wherein either of their
views was expressed on the Establishment Clause. 177 Lee does, how-
ever, give some indication as to how both Justices will vote in subse-
quent Establishment Clause cases. Justice Souter appears commit-
ted to stare decisis, and would, therefore, be in favor of retaining the
Lemon test. 78 Justice Thomas, by contrast, appears to take a more
accommodationist stance toward the Establishment Clause, similar
that the Court may be willing to allow the coercion test to... supplant entirely... the
Lemon framework." Id. at 264. "In [Lee v.] Weisman, the Court left open the possibility
that a coercion test would replace the Lemon framework." Id. at 269.
174. See infra note 192.
175. Each of these Justices has openly expressed criticism of the Court's continued
utilization of the Lemon test. See supra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. The extent of the modifications
that Justices Blackmun and O'Connor would find acceptable remains uncertain.
177. Both Justices, however, were questioned about their Establishment Clause
philosophies at their confirmation hearings. When asked about the Establishment Clause
and the Lemon test, Justice Souter suggested "that the Coures current interpretation of
the Establishment Clause, the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman raised difficult is-
sues." 16A THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON
SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1990, at 1364 (Ray M. Mersky et al. eds., 1992)
(quoting transcript of David H. Souter's hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Sept. 17, 1991, at 105). However, Justice Souter "did not repudiate the Lemon test." Id.
Further, he stated "that he did 'not approach the Court with any inclination or agenda' to
change the law...." Id. Instead, "he would listen to the arguments for such a change but
would give appropriately heavy weight to precedent." Id.
When questioned about the Establishment Clause at his confirmation hearings, Jus-
tice Thomas remarked: "I have an open mind with respect to the debate over the applica-
tion of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test." Souring on Lemon, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1992, at 48, 48.
Prior to his confirmation, one media source stated: "Thomas has quoted his mother as
saying, Then they took God out of the schools, the schools went to hell ... ' [and Thomas
has] added, 'She may be right.'" Evan Thomas, Where Does He Stand, NEWSWEEK, July
15, 1991, at 16.
178. Justice Souter expressed his commitment to stare decisis at his confirmation
hearings and also in Lee, his first Establishment Clause opinion. See supra note 177.
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to that taken by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice
Scalia in Lee. 79 As a result, he too may become critical of the Lemon
framework.
Justice Stevens is the lone Justice on the Court who vehe-
mently supports the continued use of the Lemon test.8 '
Therefore, it is unlikely that it will be retained as the test for
deciding Establishment Clause questions. There are enough votes at
present to explicitly overrule Lemon. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Jus-
tice White, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas
would agree to an outright rejection of Lemon. It appears that Jus-
tice Blackmun and Justice O'Connor would still vote in favor of
modifications to the Lemon test which would require at least a par-
tial overruling of Lemon v. Kurtzman.'8' Justice Stevens and Justice
Souter would remain, in all likelihood, the only supporters of the
Court's continued use of the Lemon test.
The proper role for the coercion analysis in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence was neither comprehensively defined nor offi-
cially adopted in Lee. In fact, the judicial composition of the Lee ma-
jority does not comport with a reasoned analysis of each Justice's
ideological dispositions toward a coercion analysis.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Scalia
joined Justice Kennedy's opinion in Allegheny 182 indicating their
agreement with his advocation of the coercion analysis as a re-
placement for the faulty Lemon test. Moreover, Justice Scalia joined
Justice Kennedy again in a similar criticism of Lemon and articula-
tion of the coercion analysis in Mergens.183 Consequently, it appeared
that these four Justices would align to support the readoption of the
coercion analysis in Lee v. Weisman.
It was also evident prior to Lee that Justice Blackmun, Justice
Stevens and Justice O'Connor did not favor a coercion analysis.
Theoretically, these three Justices should have argued against the
adoption of a coercion analysis in Lee v. Weisman.
Prior to Lee, the resolution of the Lemon-coercion dichotomy by
Justice Souter and Justice Thomas remained unknown." Justice
179. In Lee, Justice Thomas voted with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and
Justice Scalia-all long-standing critics of the Lemon test.
180. In Allegheny, Justice Stevens avidly supported Lemon. County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 645-55 (1989). "There is no reason to believe that [he] would relax
his adherence to the traditional Lemon tests... ." Mawdsley & Russo, supra note 147, at
197.
181. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
182. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Allegheny is discussed
supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
183. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Mergens is discussed supra notes 133-38.
184. Although questioned at their confirmation hearings about the Lemon test, Jus-
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Souter's comments at his confirmation hearings about the role of
stare decisis indicated that he would not be an advocate of the coer-
cion analysis, but would instead support the Lemon test. Justice
Thomas' vote could have gone either way."5
In short, a breakdown of the Court on the coercion analysis
immediately preceding Lee would have placed Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, Justice White, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy favoring
the adoption of the coercion analysis; Justice Blackmun, Justice Ste-
vens, Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter opposing the adoption of
the coercion analysis; and Justice Thomas casting the swing vote.
This is not what occurred!
Defying all predictions, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in
Lee was joined by Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens, Justice
O'Connor and Justice Souter. A reading of the "majority opinion by
itself might lead one to conclude that Lemon had been replaced by a
'coercion' test-some element of compelled participation in religious
observance would be necessary for a governmental practice to violate
the establishment clause."8 6 However, that conclusion would be
premature. While it is true that Justice Kennedy argued in favor of
the coercion analysis, "the four justices who joined Justice
Kennedy .... wrote separately to emphasize that coercion is... not
required, to abridge the establishment clause."" 7 The Justices who
had previously agreed with Justice Kennedy's coercion analysis-
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Scalia--dis-
sented in Lee and were joined by Justice Thomas.'88
Two explanations can be advanced as to why the decision in Lee
defied all predictions. The first explanation is that the unexpected
alignments could have resulted from a difference of opinion among
the Justices as to the proper definition of coercion and the result
which should be reached. Justice Kennedy and the dissenters di-
verged in Lee as a result of conflicting interpretations of coercion. In
Lee, as opposed to Allegheny and Mergens, Justice Kennedy defined
coercion "broadly to encompass social and psychological pressure as
well as brute force."18 9 This definition of coercion was perhaps too
tice Souter and Justice Thomas were never asked about their philosophy with respect to
the coercion analysis. See supra note 177.
185. Justice Thomas indicated at his confirmation hearings that he had an "open
mind" with respect to the Establishment Clause. See supra note 177.
186. McCarthy, supra note 173, at 8.
187. Id. at 9.
188. As one Supreme Court observer has stated: "For the past decade Rehnquist and
White, now joined by Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, have been trying to scuttle
the [Lemon] test for an alternative that would permit unabashed government support for
religion, including school prayer." Jeffrey Rosen, Lemon Law, NEW REPUBLIc, Mar. 29,
1993, at 17.
189. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991-Forward: The Justices of
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expansive for the dissenters in Lee."0 Conversely, Justice Kennedy
and the other Justices in the majority may have converged because
of the result that was reached; they were all in favor of striking
down the graduation prayers as unconstitutional.
The second explanation for the result in Lee may have to do
with the facts of the case. The facts in Lee concerned only the spe-
cific practice of invocations and benedictions at graduation ceremo-
nies, which occurred once a year, and not a more common religious
practice occurring in public schools on a daily basis. Thus, the facts
were extremely specific and did not provide an adequate basis upon
which to announce a new Establishment Clause doctrine. 191 Quite
possibly, the Court was waiting for an Establishment Clause ques-
tion that would address a wider range of concerns than those before
the Court in Lee.
When the coercion analysis is narrowed in a more factually ap-
propriate case, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice White, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, will vote in favor
of its readoption.
CONCLUSION
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman, the
future of the coercion analysis in Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence seems fairly certain. Within the next few terms, another Es-
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 38 (1992). "Justice Kennedy looked in [Lee
v.] Weisman to sociology and psychology rather than to history and tradition to inform his
interpretation of the Establishment Clause." Id. at 39 (footnote omitted).
190. The dissent instead adopted a traditional definition of coercion-that govern-
mental action coerces people only when it threatens them with legal penalty. Lee v.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2683-84 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued
that the definition of coercion should come from "the disciples of Blackstone rather than
of Freud." Id. at 2684. If a traditional definition of coercion had been applied to the
prayers in Lee they may have survived constitutional scrutiny, since the students would
have received no punishments as a result of failure to attend the ceremony or to stand
during the prayers. Leading Cases, supra note 173, at 264. In order for the dissenters to
have joined Justice Kennedy's opinion, the coercion analysis would have had to have been
narrowly tailored as it was in Allegheny and Mergens and the prayers would have had to
have been upheld.
191. Robert L. Cord, Church, State, and the Rehnquist Court, NAT'L REV., Aug. 17,
1992, at 35. As Kathleen Sullivan has commented: "[Lee v.] Weisman may have been a
poor vehicle for those who would have pioneered a narrow coercion test...." Sullivan,
supra note 189, at 39. Instead, Justice Kennedy "embraced a more cautious approach in
[Lee v.] Weisman, adhering to and modestly extending the Court's school prayer prece-
dents, but declining to consider the contours of the Establishment Clause beyond the
case's specific facts." Id. One scholar has commented: "In essence, I see Justice Kennedy
saying that today the Supreme Court decides this case only and does not rule on any of
the difficult church-state issues which have divided the Court and which still are open for
reconsideration." Cord, supra, at 37.
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tablishment Clause case, with a broader, more factually appropriate
basis, will present itself to the Court. Therein, Justice Kennedy,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White,'92 Justice Scalia,
and Justice Thomas will definitively overrule Lemon, and adopt a
narrowly defined coercion analysis as the framework by which to
decide Establishment Clause questions. In so doing, the Supreme
Court will be providing for a greater acknowledgement and accom-
modation of religion in American society-a position consistent with
the intent of the Framers of the Establishment Clause and with the
Court's early Establishment Clause jurisprudence. When such a
case is decided, the Supreme Court will have come full circle.
192. A year after the Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman and subsequent to the
writing of this Comment, Justice Byron White retired from the Supreme Court after 31
years. Justice White was a strong critic of the Lemon test, see supra notes 95-96 and ac-
companying text, and also had been a supporter of the coercion analysis, see supra notes
119-21 and accompanying text. After Justice White's retirement, only four votes remain
to overrule Lemon and adopt the coercion analysis as the mechanism for deciding Estab-
lishment Clause questions.
The vacancy created by Justice White's retirement has been filled by Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, formerly a judge on the D.C. Circuit. It is too early in Justice Ginsburg's first
term on the Supreme Court to determine her stance on the Establishment Clause. Fur-
ther, "[t]here is very little in her record on the D.C. Circuit on which to base a prediction
of what Justice Ginsburg's position will be on the Establishment Clause." Jesse H.
Choper, Benchmarks, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1993, at 78, 80.
However, some indication of Justice Ginsburg's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
can be gleaned from her testimony at her Senate confirmation hearings. When asked
what the appropriate test should be for deciding Establishment Clause questions, Justice
Ginsburg responded that she did not "have a satisfactory alternative" to Lemon, but
added that she was "open to arguments, to ideas." Hearings of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on the Confirmation of Ruth Bader Ginsburg as Supreme Court Justice, July
21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal News Service File. Therefore, it is
plausible that Justice Ginsburg would endorse the coercion analysis as an alternative to
the Lemon test. But cf Choper, supra, at 80 (noting that Justice Ginsburg's "general
background points to her being much more a church-state 'separationist' than Justice
White, and much less likely to align herself with Justice Kennedy's more
'accomodationist' 'coercion' approach").

